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Episodic memories allow us to remember not only that we have
seen an item before but also where and when we have seen it
(context). Sometimes, we can confidently report that we have seen
something (familiarity) but cannot recollect where or when it was
seen. Thus, the two components of episodic recall, familiarity and
recollection, can be behaviorally dissociated. It is not clear, how-
ever, whether these two components of memory are represented
separately by distinct brain structures or different populations of
neurons in a single anatomical structure. Here, we report that the
spiking activity of single neurons in the human hippocampus and
amygdala [the medial temporal lobe (MTL)] contain information
about both components of memory. We analyzed a class of
neurons that changed its firing rate to the second presentation of
a previously novel stimulus. We found that the neuronal activity
evoked by the presentation of a familiar stimulus (during retrieval)
distinguishes stimuli that will be successfully recollected from
stimuli that will not be recollected. Importantly, the ability to
predict whether a stimulus is familiar is not influenced by whether
the stimulus will later be recollected. We thus conclude that human
MTL neurons contain information about both components of
memory. These data support a continuous strength of memory
model of MTL function: the stronger the neuronal response, the
better the memory.
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Episodic memories allow us to remember not only whether wehave seen something before but also where and when (contex-
tual information). One of the defining features of an episodic
memory is the combination of multiple pieces of experienced
information into one unit of memory. An episodic memory is, by
definition, an event that happened only once. Thus, the encoding
of an episodic memory must be successful after a single expe-
rience. When we recall such a memory, we are vividly aware that
we have personally experienced the facts (where, when) associ-
ated with it. This contrasts with pure familiarity memory, which
includes recognition, but not the ‘‘where’’ and ‘‘when’’ features.
The medial temporal lobe (MTL), which receives input from a
wide variety of sensory and prefrontal areas, plays a crucial role
in the acquisition and retrieval of recent episodic memories.
Neurons in the primate MTL respond to a wide variety of
stimulus attributes, such as object identity (1, 2) and spatial
location (3). Similarly, the MTL is involved in the detection of
novel stimuli (4, 5). Some neurons carry information about the
familiarity or novelty of a stimulus (6, 7) and are capable of
changing that response after a single learning trial (6). TheMTL,
and in particular the hippocampus, are thus ideally suited to
combine information about the familiarity/novelty of a stimulus
with other attributes, such as the place and time of occurrence.
The successful recall of an experience depends on neuronal
activity during acquisition, maintenance, and retrieval. The MTL
plays a role in all three components. Here, we focus on the neuronal
activity of individual neurons during retrieval. TheMTL is crucially
involved in the retrieval of previously acquiredmemories: brief local
electrical stimulation of the human MTL during retrieval leads to
severe retrieval deficits (8). Two fundamental components of an
episodic memory are whether the stimulus is familiar and, if it is,
whether information is available about when and where the stim-
ulus was previously experienced (e.g., recollection). How these
components interact, however, is not clear. A key question is
whether there are distinct anatomical structures involved in these
two processes (familiarity vs. recollection).
Some have argued that the hippocampus is exclusively in-
volved in the process of recollection but not familiarity (9, 10).
Evidence from behavioral studies with lesion patients, however,
seems to argue against this view (11–13). Rather than removing
the capability of recollection while leaving recognition (famil-
iarity) intact, hippocampal lesions cause a decrease in overall
memory capacity rather than the loss of a specific function.
Lesion studies, however, do not allow one to distinguish between
acquisition vs. retrieval deficits.
Recollection of episodic memories is difficult to study in
animals (but see ref. 14) but can easily be assessed in humans.
Recordings from humans offer the unique opportunity to ob-
serve neurons engaged in the acquisition and retrieval of epi-
sodic memories. We recorded from single neurons in the human
hippocampus and amygdala during retrieval of episodic memo-
ries. We used a memory task that enabled us to determine
whether a stimulus was only recognized as familiar or whether an
attribute associated with the stimulus (the spatial location) could
also be recollected. We hypothesized that the neuronal activity
evoked by the presentation of a familiar stimulus would differ
depending on whether the location of the stimulus would later
be recollected successfully. We found that the neuronal activity
contains information about both the familiarity and the recol-
lective component of the memory.
Results
Behavior. During learning, subjects [see supporting information
(SI) Table 1 for neuropsychological data] were shown 12 differ-
ent pictures presented for 4 s each (Fig. 1A). Subjects were asked
to remember the pictures they had seen (recognition) and where
they had seen them (position on the screen). After a delay of 30
min or 24 h, subjects were shown a sequence of 12 previously
seen (‘‘old’’) and 12 entirely different (‘‘new’’) pictures (Fig. 1B).
Subjects indicated whether they had seen the picture before and
where the stimulus was when they saw it the first time. We refer
to the true status of the stimulus as old or new and the subject’s
response as ‘‘familiar’’ or ‘‘novel.’’ With the exception of error
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trials the two terms are equivalent. Subjects remembered 90 
3% of all old stimuli and for 60 5% of those they remembered
the correct location (Fig. 1C). Some subjects were not able to
recollect the spatial location of the stimuli whereas others
remembered the location of almost all stimuli. For each 30-min
retrieval session, we determined whether the patient exhibited,
on average, above-chance (R) or at-chance (R) spatial rec-
ollection and then calculated the behavioral performance sep-
arately (Fig. 1 D and E). Patients with good same-day spatial
recollection performance (30-min R) remembered the spatial
location of on average 77 6% (significantly different from 25%
chance, P  0.05, z test) of stimuli they correctly recognized as
familiar whereas at-chance patients (30-min R) recollected
only 35  4% of stimuli (approaching but not achieving statis-
tical significance, P  0.07). Thus, there were two behavioral
groups for the 30-min delay: one with good and one with poor
recollection performance.
We also tested a subset of the subjects that had good recol-
lection performance on the first day with an additional test 24 h
later (four subjects). Subjects saw a new set of pictures and were
asked to remember them overnight. Overnight memory for the
spatial location was good (66  1%, P  0.05). All three
behavioral groups (30-min R, 30-min R, 24-h R) had good
recognition performance (Fig. 1E) that did not differ signifi-
cantly between groups (ANOVA, P  0.24). The false-positive
(FP) rate was on average 7  3% and did not differ significantly
between groups (ANOVA, P  0.37).
Single-Unit Responses During Retrieval.We recorded the activity of
412 well separated units in the hippocampus (n  218) and
amygdala (n  194) in 17 recording sessions from eight patients
[24.24  11.51 neurons  SD per session]. The mean firing rate
of all neurons was 1.45  0.10 Hz and was not significantly
different between the amygdala and the hippocampus (SI Fig.
5A). For each neuron, we determined whether its firing differed
significantly in response to correctly recognized old vs. new
stimuli. Note that ‘‘old’’ indicates that the subject has seen the
image previously during the learning part of the experiment.
Thus, the difference between a novel and old stimulus is only a
single stimulus presentation (single-trial learning). We found a
subset of neurons (114, 6.7 4.7 per session; see SI Table 2) that
contained significant information about whether the stimulus
was old or new. Because error trials were excluded for this
analysis, the physical status (old or new) is equal to the perceived
status (familiar or novel) of the stimulus. Neurons were classified
as either familiarity (n  37) or novelty detectors (n  77)
depending on the stimulus category for which their firing rate
was higher (see Methods). The analysis presented here is based
on this subset of neurons. The mean firing rate of all significant
neurons (1.6 0.2 Hz, n 114) did not differ significantly from
the neurons not classified as such (1.4  0.1 Hz, n  298).
Similarly, the mean firing rate of neurons that increase firing in
response to novel stimuli was not different from neurons that
increase firing in response to old stimuli (SI Fig. 5 C and D).
The response of a neuron that increased firing for new stimuli
is illustrated in Fig. 2 A–C. This neuron fired, on average, 1.1 
0.2 spikes per second when a new stimulus was presented and
only 0.6  0.1 spike per second when a correctly recognized old
stimulus was presented (Fig. 2C). Of the 10 old stimuli (2 were
wrongly classified as novel and are excluded), 8 were later
recollected, whereas 2 were not. For the 8 later recollected items
blank (2s)
image (4s)
blank (2s)
 Learning Trial
A
Recognition trial
image (4s)
blank (2s)
blank (2s)
Familiarity
blank (2s)
Source recollection
(1) (3)
(4)(2)
Where was it? 
1) left up
2) left bottom
3) right up
4) right bottom
Have you seen 
this image before?
Press OLD
or NEW Where was it? 
1) left up
2) left bottom
3) right up
4) right bottom
0
10
20
30
40
50
60
70
80
90
]
%[
 etar
 tih
 DLO
30m R+ 30m R- 24h R+
0
10
20
30
40
50
60
70
80
90
]
%[
 tcerroc
 llacer
Recog-
nition
Recollection
0
10
20
30
40
50
60
70
80
90
]
%[
 ec
na
mrofrep
Session Type
*
*
***
*** ***
***
***
30m R+ 30m R- 24h R+
Session Type
B C D E
Fig. 1. Experimental setup and behavioral performance. (AandB) The experiment consists of learning (A) and retrieval (B) blocks. (C) Patients exhibited memory
for both the pictures they had seen (recognition) and where they had seen them (recollection). n 17 sessions. (D) Two different time delays were used: 30 min
and 24 h. Thirty-minute delay sessions were separated into two groups according to whether recollection performance was above-chance or not. (E) For all
groups, patients had good recognition performance for old stimuli, whether they were able to successfully recollect the source. n  7, 5, and 4 sessions,
respectively. Errors are SEM. Horizontal lines indicate chance performance. R, above-chance recollection; R, at-chance recollection.
#
 lairT
0 2 4 6 8
0.5
1.0
1.5
2.0
[s]
]zH[
OldNew0
0.5
1.0
1.5
ces/sekips
R+ R-
0.5ms
20uV
0 2 4 6 8[s]
Old
New
]
%[
 es
nopser
New OldR− R+
-20
0
20
40
60
]
%[
 es
nopser
-20
0
20
40
60
New OldR− R+
ces/sekips
ces/sekips
Familiarity
New R- R+
New R- R+
Novelty
A B C
D E F
Fig. 2. Single-cell response. (A–C) Firing of a unit in the right hippocampus
that increases its firing in response to new stimuli that were correctly recog-
nized (novelty detector). (A) Raster of all trials during retrieval and the
waveforms associated with every spike. Trials: new (blue), old and recollected
(red, R), and old and not recollected (green, R). (B) Poststimulus time
histogram. (C) Mean number of spikes after stimulus onset. Firing was signif-
icantly larger in response to new stimuli and the neuron fired more spikes in
response to stimuli that were later not recollected compared with stimuli that
were recollected. (D) The hypothesis: The less that novelty neurons fire, the
more likely it is that a stimulus will be recollected. The more that familiarity-
detecting neurons fire, the more likely it is that a stimulus will be recollected.
The dashed line indicates the baseline. (E and F) Normalized firing rate
(baseline  0) of all novelty (E) and familiarity-detecting (F) neurons during
above-chance sessions (30-min R). Novelty neurons fired more in response to
not recollected items (R) whereas familiarity neurons fired more in response
to recollected items (R). Errors are SEM. nr of trials, from left to right: 388,
79, 259, and 338 (E) and 132, 31, 96, and 127 (F).
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(R), the neuron fired significantly fewer spikes than for the not
recollected items (0.5  0.1 vs. 0.9  0.3, P  0.05) (Fig. 2C).
Thus, this neuron fired fewer spikes for items that were both
recollected and recognized than for items that were not recol-
lected. We found a similar but opposite pattern for neurons that
increase their firing in response to old stimuli (see below). We
thus hypothesized that these neurons represent a continuous
gradient of memory strength: the stronger the memory, the more
spikes that are fired by familiarity-detecting neurons (Fig. 2D).
Similarly, we hypothesized that the opposite relation would hold
for novelty neurons: the fewer spikes, the stronger the memory.
We analyzed three groups of sessions separately: same-day
with good recollection performance (30-min R), same-day with
at-chance recollection performance (30-min R), and overnight
with above-chance recollection (24-h R). Sessions were as-
signed to the 30-min R or 30-min R groups based on
behavioral performance. We hypothesized that if the neuronal
firing evoked by the presentation of an old stimulus is purely
determined by its familiarity, the neuronal firing should not
differ between stimuli that were only recognized and stimuli that
were also recollected. However, if there is a recollective com-
ponent, then a difference in firing rate should only be observed
for recording sessions in which the subject exhibited good
recollection performance.
First, we examined the novelty (Fig. 2E) and familiarity
neurons (Fig. 2F) in the 30-min R group. The prestimulus
baseline was, on average, 1.7 0.4 Hz (range 0.06–9.5) and 2.6
1.0 Hz (range 0.2–12.9) for novelty and familiarity neurons,
respectively, and was not significantly different. Units respond-
ing to novel stimuli increased their firing rate on average by 58
5% relative to baseline. Similarly, units responding to old stimuli
increased their firing by 41  8% during the second stimulus
presentation. We divided the trials for repeated stimuli into two
classes: stimuli that were later recollected (R) and not recol-
lected (R). A within-neuron repeated measures ANOVA (fac-
tor trial-type: new, R or R) revealed a significant effect of trial
type for both novelty (P  1  1012) and familiarity units (P 
1 106). This test assumes that neurons respond independently
from each other. For both types of units, we performed two
planned comparisons: (i) new vs. R and (ii) R vs. R. For
novelty neurons, the hypothesis was that the amount of neural
activity would have the following relation: new  R and R 
R. For familiarity, the hypothesis was the opposite: new  R
and R R (see Fig. 2D). For novelty and familiarity neurons,
each prediction proved to be significant (one-tailed t test.
Novelty: new vs. R t  4.3, P  1  104 and R vs. R t 
2.2, P  0.01. Familiarity: new vs. R t  1.7, P  0.05 and R
vs. R t  2.0, P  0.02). Thus, both novelty- and familiarity-
detecting neurons signaled that a stimulus is repeated even in the
absence of recollection (new vs. R) and whether a stimulus was
recollected or not (R vs. R).
The same analysis applied to the remaining groups (30-min R
and 24-h R) revealed a significant main effect of trial type for
novelty (P  1  104 and P  1  105, respectively) and
familiarity neurons (P  0.001 and P  0.001, respectively).
However, only the new vs. R planned comparison was signif-
icant (novelty: P  0.001 and P  0.001; familiarity: P  0.001
and P  0.001), whereas the R vs. R comparison was not
significant for either group (novelty: P  0.6 and P  0.7;
familiarity: P  0.68 and 0.49). Thus, the activity of these units
was different for new vs. old stimuli, but the response to old items
was indistinguishable for recollected vs. not recollected stimuli.
Quantification of the Single-Trial Responses. Both groups of neu-
rons distinguished recollected from not recollected stimuli, but
the difference was of opposite sign. In the novelty case, neurons
fire less strongly for recollected items (Fig. 2E), whereas, in the
familiarity case, neurons fire more strongly (Fig. 2F). We thus
hypothesized that both neuron classes represent a continuous
gradient of memory strength. In one case, firing increases with the
strength of memory (familiarity detectors), whereas, in the other
case, firing decreases with the strength of memory (novelty detec-
tors). Thus, a strong memory (R) is signaled both by strong firing
of familiarity units and weak firing of novelty neurons. Weak
memory (R) is signaled by moderate firing of familiarity and
novelty neurons. No memory (a new item) is signaled by strong
firing of novelty detectors and weak firing of familiarity detectors.
Another feature of the response is that it is often bimodal (see also
SI Fig. 6). For example, familiarity neurons do not only increase
their firing for old items but also decrease firing to new items (Fig.
2F). This pattern can also be observed in the firing pattern shown
in Fig. 2A: Immediately after stimulus onset, this neuron reduces its
firing if the stimulus is old.
We developed a response index R(i) that takes into account
the opposite sign of the gradient for the two neuron types, the
bimodal response and different baseline firing rates. This index
makes use of the entire dynamic range of each neuron’s response.
R(i) is equal to the number of spikes fired during a particular trial
i, minus the mean number of spikes fired to all new stimuli
divided by the baseline (Eq. 1). For example, if a neuron doubles
its firing rate for an old stimulus and remains at baseline for a
novel stimulus, the response index would equal 100%. By
definition, R(i) is negative for novelty units, and, thus, we
multiplied R(i) by 1 if the unit was previously classified as a
novelty unit.
First, we describe the response of the 30-min R group. In
terms of the response index, the average response was signifi-
cantly stronger to presentation of old stimuli that were later
recollected when compared with stimuli that were later not
recollected. This was true for a pairwise comparison for every
neuron (Fig. 3A, 68% vs. 50%, n  45 neurons from four
subjects) and for a trial-by-trial comparison (Fig. 3B, 67% vs.
45%, P  0.01, n  number of trials). Note that the same
difference exists if neurons from the hippocampus (n  30, R
vs. R, P  0.05) or the amygdala (n  15, R vs. R, P  0.05)
are considered separately (see SI Fig. 7A and SI Table 2). The
difference in response (of 22%) is entirely due to recollection of
the source. Replotting the data as a cumulative distribution
function (cdf) shows a shift of the entire distribution because of
recollection (Fig. 3C, green vs. red line; P 0.01). The cdf shows
the proportion of all trials that are smaller than a given value of
the response index. It illustrates the entire distribution of the
data rather than just its mean. We also calculated the response
index for correctly identified new items. By definition, the mean
response to novel stimuli is 0, but it varies trial-by-trial (blue
line). The shift in response induced by familiarity alone (blue vs.
green, P  1  105) lies in between the shift induced by
comparing novel stimuli with old stimuli that were successfully
recollected (Fig. 3C, blue vs. red, P  1  1019). The response
index is thus a continuous measure of memory strength. From
the point of view of this measure, novel items are distractors, and
old items are targets. We fitted normal density functions to the
three populations (distractors, R and R targets). R Targets
were more different from the distractors than were R targets
(Fig. 3D).
Is there a significant difference between recollected and not
recollected stimuli for patients whose behavioral performance
was near chance levels? We found that the mean response to
recollected and not recollected stimuli did not differ (Fig. 3 E
and F; 45% vs. 46%, P  0.93). This is further illustrated by the
complete overlap of the distribution of responses to R and R
stimuli (Fig. 3F, P  0.53). (This is also true if hippocampal
neurons are evaluated separately, SI Fig. 7B). Thus, the differ-
ence (22%) associated with good recollection performance was
abolished in the subjects with poor recollection memory.
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Was the neuronal response still enhanced by good recollection
performance after the 24-h time delay? Subjects in the 24-h delay
group had good recollection performance (66%) that was not
significantly different from their performance on the 30-min
delay period. Thus, information about the source of the stimulus
was available to the subject. Surprisingly, however, we found that
the firing difference between recollected and not recollected
items was no longer present (Fig. 3 G and H). Firing differed by
59% for recollected items compared with 61% for not recol-
lected items (Fig. 3 G and H; P  0.81). [This is also true if
hippocampal neurons are evaluated separately (SI Fig. 7C)]. This
lack of difference between R and R items is in contrast to the
30-min R delay sessions, where a difference of 22% was
observed.
Neural Activity During Recognition Errors. What was the neural
response evoked by stimuli that were incorrectly recognized by
the subject? Patients could make two different types of recog-
nition errors: (i) not remembering an item [false negative (FN)]
and (ii) identifying a new picture as an old picture (FP). Here,
we pooled all same-day sessions (13 sessions from eight patients)
regardless of recollection performance. First, we focused on the
FNs. We hypothesized that if the neuronal activity truly reflects
the behavior, the response should be equal to the response to
correctly identified novel stimuli. However, if the neurons we
recorded from represent a general representation of memory
strength, we expect to see a response that is smaller than that
observed for correctly recognized items. Indeed, we found that
the mean response during ‘‘forgot’’ error trials was 14 3% (Fig.
4A, yellow), significantly different from the response to novel
stimuli [Fig. 4B, blue vs. yellow; P  1  104, Kolmogorov–
Smirnov (ks) test]. It was also significantly weaker when com-
pared with all correctly recognized items (Fig. 4B, yellow vs.
green and red, P  0.05, ks test, Bonferonni-corrected). What
was the response to stimuli that were incorrectly identified as
familiar? We hypothesized that if the FPs represent responses
that were truly wrongly identified as old (rather than an acci-
dental button press), we would observe a neuronal response that
was significantly different from that observed for novel items.
Indeed, we found that the response to FPs was significantly
different from 0 and from the response to novel stimuli (Fig. 4B,
blue vs. gray; ks test P  0.007). The response to FPs and FNs
was not significantly different (Fig. 4B, gray vs. yellow; ks test,
P  0.14). (For the previous analysis we pooled neurons
recorded from the hippocampus and the amygdala. The same
response pattern holds, however, if hippocampal units are
evaluated separately; SI Fig. 7D). This pattern of activity during
behavioral errors is consistent with the idea that the neurons
represent memory strength on a continuum.
Discussion
We analyzed the spiking activity of neurons in the human MTL
during retrieval of declarative memories. We found that the
neural activity differentiated between stimuli that were only
recognized as familiar and stimuli for which (in addition) the
spatial location could be recollected. Further, we found that the
same neural activity was also present during behavioral errors,
but with reduced amplitude. This data are compatible with a
continuous signal of memory strength: the stronger the neuronal
response, the better the memory. Forgotten stimuli have the
weakest memory strength and stimuli that are only recognized
but not recollected have medium strength. The strongest mem-
ory (and thus neuronal response) is associated with stimuli that
are both recognized and recollected.
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We used the spatial location of the stimuli during learning as
an objective measure of recollection. An alternative measure is
the ‘‘remember/know’’ paradigm (9). However, this measure
suffers from subjectivity and response bias. Alternative theories
hold that remember/know judgments reflect differences in mem-
ory strength rather then different recognition processes (15).
Thus, we chose to use an explicit measure of recollection instead.
We tested two different time delays: same-day (30 min) and
overnight (24 h). Despite good behavioral performance on both
days, the neuronal firing only distinguished between R and R
trials on the same day. Thus, although the information was
accessible to the patient, it was not present anymore in the form
of spike counts—at least in the neurons from which we recorded.
In contrast, information about the familiarity of the stimulus was
still present at 24 h, and spike counts distinguished equally well
between familiar and novel pictures (SI Fig. 8). Although the
lack of recordings from cortical areas prevents us from making
any definitive claims about this phenomena, it is nevertheless
interesting to note that these two components of memory
(familiarity and recollection) may be transferred from the MTL
to other brain areas with different time courses. Indeed, recent
data investigating the replay of spatial sequences by hippocampal
units suggest that episodic memories could be transferred to
cortex very quickly. Replay starts in quiet (but awake) periods
shortly after encoding and continues during sleep (16).
We found that the responses described here can be found both
in the hippocampus and the amygdala. Previous human studies
have similarly found that visual responses can be found in both
areas with little difference (2, 17). Similarly, recordings from
monkeys have also identified amygdala neurons that (i) respond
to novelty and (ii) habituate rapidly (18). It has long been
recognized that the amygdala plays an important role in rapid
learning. This is exemplified by its role in conditioned taste
aversion, which is acquired in a single trial, is strongly novelty-
dependent and requires the amygdala (19).
The subset of neurons that we selected for analysis exhibited
a significant firing difference between old and new stimuli during
the stimulus presentation period. This selection criteria allows
for a wide variety of response patterns. The simplest case is when
a neuron increases firing to one category and remains at baseline
for the other. But more complex patterns are possible: the
neuron could decrease firing for one category and remain at
baseline for the other. Or the response could be bimodal, e.g.,
increase to one category and decrease to the other. To further
investigate this, we compared firing during the stimulus period
to the prestimulus baseline (see SI Table 2 and SI Discussion).
Fifty-four percent of the neurons changed activity significantly
for the trial type for which the unit was classified (i.e., old trials
for familiarity neurons). Ninety-two percent of the neurons
change their firing rate relative to baseline for either type of trial
(e.g., decrease in firing rate of familiarity neurons for new trials).
Thus, 38% of the neurons signal information by a significant
firing decrease, and 8% of the neurons have a bimodal response
that individually is not significantly different from baseline. We
maintain that the firing behavior of this 8% group contains
information about the novelty of the stimulus, even though the
responses are not significantly different from baseline. Below, we
describe several scenarios by which this 8% population might
contain decodable information. We repeated our analysis with
only the remaining 92% of neurons to assess whether our
previous conclusions, based on the entire data-set, still hold true.
We found that all results remain valid: The within-repeated
ANOVA for the 30-min R group revealed a significant differ-
ence of new vs. R and R vs. R for both novelty (P 1 104
and P  0.03, respectively) and familiarity units (P  0.05 and
P  0.02, respectively). Similarly, the per-neuron (n  42
neurons, P  0.03) and the per-trial comparison (P  0.01)
remained significant (compare to Fig. 3 A–C). Considering only
hippocampal neurons that fire significantly different from base-
line, the difference between R and R (P 0.04), R and new
(P 0.001) and new vs. FNs (P 0.003) remained significant (all
are tailed ks tests; compare with SI Fig. 7A). All R vs. R
comparisons for the 30-min R and 24-h sessions remained
insignificant.
How might a neural network decode the information about a
stimulus if it is signaled with no change or a decrease in firing
rate? One obvious possibility is by altering excitatory-inhibitory
network transmission: If the neuron that signals with a decrease
in firing is connected to an inhibitory unit that in turn inhibits an
excitatory unit, the excitatory neuron would only fire if the input
neuron decreases its firing rate. A similar network could be used
to decode information that is present in an unchanged firing rate.
How can a network decode information from units that are
significantly different new vs. old but not relative to baseline?
One possibility is that the network gets an additional input that
signals the onset of the stimulus. Thus, it knows which time
period to extract. Also, although we can only listen to one single
neuron, a readout mechanism gets input frommany neurons and
can thus read signals with much lower signal-to-noise ratios.
Models of Memory Retrieval. It is generally accepted that recog-
nition judgments are based on information from (at least) the
two processes of familiarity and recollection. How these two
processes interact, however, is unclear. Here, we have shown that
both components of memory are represented in the firing of
neurons in the hippocampus and amgydala. Clearly, the neuronal
firing described here cannot be attributed to one of the two
processes exclusively. Rather, the neuronal firing is consistent
with both components summing in an additive fashion.
This result has implications for models of memory retrieval.
There are two fundamentally different models of how familiarity
and recollection interact. The first (i) model proposes that
recognition judgments are either based on an all-or-nothing
recollection process (‘‘high-threshold’’) or on a continuous fa-
miliarity process. Only if recollection fails is the familiarity signal
considered (10, 20). An alternative (ii) model is that both
recollection and familiarity are continuous signals that are
combined additively to form a continuous signal of memory
strength that is used for forming the recognition judgment (21).
Our data are more compatible with the latter model (ii). We
found that the stronger the firing of familiarity neurons, themore
likely that recollection will be successful. However, the ability to
correctly decode the familiarity of the stimulus does not depend
on whether recollection will be successful. This is demonstrated
by the single-trial decoding (SI Fig. 8): Recognition performance
only marginally depends on whether the stimulus will be recol-
lected or not. Also, the familiarity of the stimulus can be decoded
equally well in patients that lack the ability to recollect the source
entirely. Thus, the firing increase caused by recollection is
additive and uncorrelated with the familiarity signal. This is
incompatible with the high-thresholdmodel, which proposes that
either the familiarity or the recollective process is engaged. The
neurons described here distinguished novel from familiar stimuli
regardless of whether recollection was successful. Thus, the
information carried by these neurons does not exclusively
present either index. Rather, the signal represents a combination
of both.
Neuronal Firing During Behavioral Errors.What determines whether
a previously encountered stimulus is remembered or forgotten?
We found that stimuli that were wrongly identified as novel
(forgotten old stimuli) still elicited a significant response. We
found (6) that this response allows single-trial decoding with
performance significantly better than the patient’s behavior.
Thus, information about the stimulus is present at the time of
retrieval. This implies that the stimuli were (at least to some
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degree) properly encoded and maintained. However, the neural
activity associated with false negative recognition responses was
weaker than the responses to correctly recognized but not
recollected stimuli (60% reduced, Fig. 4A). The response to
false negatives fell approximately in between the response to
novel and correctly recognized familiar stimuli (Fig. 4B). The
neuronal response can thus be regarded as an indicator of
memory strength. The memory strength for not remembered
items is less than for remembered items but it is still larger than
zero. However, the memory strength was not strong enough to
elicit a ‘‘familiar’’ response. Others (22) have also found neurons
that indicate, regardless of behavior, the ‘‘true memory’’ asso-
ciated with a stimulus. Thus, the neurons considered here likely
signal the strength of memory that is used for decision making
rather than the decision itself.
False recognition is the mistaken identification of a new
stimulus as familiar. The false recognition rate in a particular
experiment is determined by many factors, including the indi-
vidual bias of the subject and the perceptual similarity of the
stimuli (gist) or their meaning (for words). Here, we found that
neurons responded similarly (but with reduced amplitude) to
stimuli that were wrongly identified as familiar when compared
with truly familiar stimuli. Thus, from the point of view of the
neuronal response, the stimuli were coded as somewhat familiar.
As such, it seems that the behavioral error possesses a neuronal
origin in the very same memory neurons that respond during a
correct response—and can thus not be exclusively attributed to
simple errors, such as pressing the wrong button. MTL lesions
result in severe amnesia, measured by a reduction in the TP rate
and an increased FP rate relative to controls. However, in
paradigms where normal subjects have high FP rates due to
semantic relatedness to studied words, amnesics have lower FP
rates than controls (23). Thus, in some situations, a functional
MTL can lead to more false memory. Similarly, activation of the
MTL (and particularly the hippocampus) during false memory
has also been observed with neuroimaging (24). This and our
finding that neuronal activity does consider such stimuli as
familiar suggests that FPs are not due to errors in decision
making.
Methods
Subjects and Electrophysiology. Subjects were 10 patients (6 male, mean age
33.7). Informed consent was obtained, and the protocol was approved by the
Review Boards of the California Institute of Technology and Huntington
Memorial Hospital. Activity was recorded from microwires embedded in the
depth electrodes (6). Single-units were identified by using a template match-
ing method (25).
Experiment. An experiment consisted of a learning and retrieval block with a
delay of either 0.5 or 24 h in between. During learning, 12 unique pictures
were presented in random order. Each picture was presented for 4 s in one of
the four quadrants of a computer screen. We asked patients to remember
both which pictures they had seen and where on the screen they had seen
them. To ensure alertness, patients were asked to indicate where the picture
was after each presentation during learning.
In each retrieval session, 24 pictures (12 new, 12 old, randomly intermixed)
were presented at the center of the screen. Afterward, the patient was asked
whether he/she had seen the picture before or not. If the answer was ‘‘old,’’
the question ‘‘Where was it?’’ was asked (see Fig. 1A). During the task, no
feedback was given.
Data Analysis. A neuron was considered responsive if the firing rate in re-
sponse to correctly recognized old vs. new stimuli was significantly different.
We tested in 2-s bins (0–2, 2–4, and 4–6 s relative to stimulus onset). A neuron
was included if its activity was significantly different in at least one of these
three bins. We used a bootstrap test (P 0.05,B 10,000, two-tailed) of the
number of spikes fired to new vs. old stimuli. We assumed that each trial is
independent; i.e., the order of trials does not matter. Neurons with more
spikes in response to new stimuli were novelty neurons, whereas neurons with
more spikes in response to old stimuli were familiarity neurons.
We also used an aggregate measure of activity that pools across neurons.
For each trial, we counted the number of spikes during the entire 6-s post-
stimulus period. The response index (Eq.1) quantifies the response during trial
i relative to the mean response to novel stimuli.
Ri
nrSpikesi mean	NEW

mean	baseline

100%. [1]
R(i) is negative for novelty detectors and positive for familiarity detectors (on
average). R(i) was multiplied by 1 if the neuron is classified as a novelty
neuron. Notice that the factor 1 depends only on the unit type. Thus,
negative R(i) values are still possible.
The cdf was constructed by calculating for each possible value x of the
response index how many examples are smaller than x. That is, F(x) P(X x),
where X is a vector of all response index values.
All statistical tests are t tests unless stated otherwise. Trial-by-trial compar-
isons of the response index are Kolmogorov–Smirnov tests. All errors are SE
unless indicated otherwise.
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